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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Dennis Ray Smith appeals from the denial of his motions requesting credit
for time seNed for time spent on probation.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Smith pied guilty to forgery and was granted a withheld judgment and
probation. (R., pp. 50-53.) Smith violated the conditions of his probation and the
district court revoked the withheld judgment, imposed a sentence of five years
with two years fixed, and placed Smith back on probation.

(R., pp. 115-16.)

When Smith again violated the conditions of his probation the court revoked
probation, ordered the sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.

143-44.) Thereafter the district court again placed Smith on probation. (R., pp.
148-50.)

After Smith's next probation violation the district court revoked the

probation and ordered the sentence executed. (R., pp. 180-81.)
About ten months later Smith moved for credit for time seNed, including
credit for time spent on probation. (R., pp. 185-94.) The district judge denied the
motion by writing "Denied" on the face of it and signing her name. (R., p. 185.)
Smith filed a notice of appeal timely from the denial of his motion. (R., pp. 19597.) Smith filed a second motion requesting credit for time seNed, which the
district judge denied by writing "Denied. Untimely" on the face of the motion. (R.,
pp. 227-47.)
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ISSUES
Smith states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Smith credit
for the time he served on probation.

2.

Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Smith's Rule
35 motion and failed to provide an adequate record in regard
to its denials of his Rule 35 motion and motion for credit for
time served?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Smith failed to demonstrate error by the trial court because his
argument that he was entitled to credit for time spent on probation against his
term of imprisonment is frivolous?
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ARGUMENT
Smith Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motions For Credit For
Time Served Because His Argument That He Is Entitled To Credit For Time
Spent On Probation Against His Term Of Imprisonment Is Frivolous
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Smith's motions to credit time spent on probation

against his sentence. 1 (R., pp. 185, 227.) Smith argues that he was entitled to
such credit, but fails to actually address controlling authority. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 5-24.)

Because Smith has failed to address controlling authority his

argument is without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit

for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67,
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763,
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The construction and application of a statute also
presents a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review.
State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 307, 142 P.3d 729, 730 (2006); State v.
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003).

The state acknowledges that the district court did not comply with I.C.R. 47 and
that the stated reason of untimeliness was not the proper ground for denial of
Smith's second motion. Any such error, however, is necessarily harmless under
the applicable legal standards. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d
918, 923 (2010) (errors may be declared harmless); State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho
690, 694, 991 P .2d 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1999) (where trial court has reached right
result it will be affirmed under correct legal theory).
1
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C.

Smith's Argument That He Was Entitled To Credit For Time Spent On
Probation Against His Sentence Is Contrary To Existing And Unchallenged
Authority
Under Idaho law an inmate is entitled to credit for time served if he is

incarcerated on that sentence. I.C. § 18-309; Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401,
403, 128 P.3d 938, 940 (2006); Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869, 187 P.3d
1241, 1244 (Ct. App. 2008). He is not entitled to credit for time served if he is not
incarcerated but is instead on probation or parole. I.C. § 18-309; I.C. § 19-2603
(time spent "at large under [a] suspended sentence shall not be counted as a
part of the term of his sentence"); I.C. § 20-209A ("time during which the person
is voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of the
board of correction, or from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall not
be estimated or counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced");
Taylor, 145 Idaho at 869, 187 P.3d at 1244 (1.C. § 18-309 "notably does not base
credit on any factor other than actual incarceration"). Indeed, a defendant is not
entitled to credit for time actually spent incarcerated during his probation against
his sentence if such incarceration was imposed as a condition of probation.
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 8, 43 P.3d 765, 767 (2002). Smith's argument that
he was entitled to credit for time spent on probation against his term of
imprisonment is meritless because it merely ignores applicable legal authority.
Even reviewed on its own merits Smith's argument is without merit. The
interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of that statute. State
v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those words must
be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute must be
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construed as a whole.

kl

"Where the language of a statute is plain and

unambiguous, [the appellate court] must give effect to the statute as written,
without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 642,
239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219
(1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000)).
The plain language of the applicable statutes shows Smith is not entitled to credit
time on probation against the execution of his sentence.
By definition, when a court places a defendant on probation it "suspend[s]
the execution of the judgment." I.C. § 19-2601 (2). The time of probation is not
limited to the actual sentence but may be up to "the maximum period for which
the defendant might have been imprisoned."

I.C. § 19-2601 (7).

That the

probation runs only while execution of the judgment is suspended and may
actually exceed the length of the sentence itself demonstrates that time on
probation is not credited toward satisfaction of the judgment.
Smith attempts to secure the result he wants from the language of I.C. §
18-309, which provides that "if ... the defendant by any legal means is temporarily
released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time
during which he was at large must not be computed as part" of the term of
imprisonment.

Specifically,

Smith

claims

that 'at

large"

means

"free;

unrestrained; not under control" and therefore cannot mean time spent under the
legal restraint imposed by probation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) This argument
fails for three reasons.
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First, "at large" does not mean free of all legal restraint. Rather, "at large"
means "not under corporal control," Black's law Dictionary, p. 125 (6 th Ed.1990);
"[n]ot in confinement or captivity," The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 715 (2d
College Ed., 1982); or "not in prison," Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary
(Cambridge Dictionaries Online).

Indeed, an escapee is not free of legal

restraint. Smith's attempt to distinguish between those who have submitted to
legal restraint on freedom and those who have not for purposes of defining "at
large" is not supported by the language of the statute.

"At large," given its

common and ordinary meaning, refers to a defendant who is not under the
physical restraint of incarceration.
Second, Smith's attempted definition mutilates the context of the phrase
"at large." Statutes must be interpreted to give effect to every word, clause and
sentence of the statute. Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902
(2005). The statute addressed by Smith provides that, in "computing the term of
imprisonment," "if," after the pronouncement of sentence imposing a term of
imprisonment, "the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from
such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during which he
was at large must not be computed as part of such term." I.C. § 18-309. Under
this plain language the "time during which he was at large" is directly related to
the temporary release "by any legal means," generally probation or parole, and is
not calculated as part of the "imprisonment." Smith's claim that the use of the
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phrase "at large" in the statute transmogrifies probation into a period of
imprisonment is baseless. 2
The context of Idaho law also shows that Smith's argument that "at large"
applies only to those who have absconded or escaped is without merit. A court
at sentencing is to consider whether a defendant is a risk to society as a result of
mental illness if the defendant is "at large." I.C. § 19-2523(e). The idea thatthis
consideration goes only to possible escapes, as Smith would have us believe, is,
at best, illogical. Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that if a prisoner
is permitted "to go at large out of the jail, except by virtue of a legal order or
process, it is an escape." Cornell v. Mason, 46 Idaho 112, 120, 268 P. 8, 11

(1928) (emphasis added). Clearly the concept of being set "at large" by legal
means is not a concept foreign to Idaho jurisprudence as claimed by Smith.
Finally, Smith's argument ignores the overall statutory scheme related to
credit for time served.

A court must construe statutes relating to the same

subject matter together to further legislative intent. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho
378, 382, 987 P.2d 290, 294 (1999). Idaho Code section 19-2603, which deals
specifically with "[p]ronouncement and execution of judgment after violation of
probation" (emphasis omitted), provides that a suspended sentence may be
"executed" and, if so, the time the defendant was "at large under such suspended
sentence shall not be counted" as time served. In addition, a defendant is not

Smith's argument that probation is not a "temporary" release from custody
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-17) is without basis. Because calculation of time served
is only needed upon revocation of probation, any application of the statute after a
probation violation means the probation was necessarily a "temporary" release
from custody.
2
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entitled to credit for time he was "voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail,
facility under the control of the board of correction, or from the custody of an
officer after his sentence."

I.C. § 20-209A.

Reading these statutes together

plainly shows legislative intent that time spent on probation, and thus "at large
under [a] suspended sentence" and "voluntarily absent from the penitentiary," not
be counted against the service of a sentence of imprisonment.
Smith's argument is without merit. Smith fails to acknowledge or address
controlling legal authority.

Even if the merits of his argument were reached

despite his failure to address controlling authority, they are baseless. Smith has
failed to show error in the denial of his motions for credit for time served.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
denial of Smith's motions for credit against his sentence for time spent on
probation.

DATED this 11th day of May, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of May, 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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